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ABSTRACT  This paper examines the critical remarks that D’Orlando (2005) addresses to the classical 
theory of value based on ‘normal’ positions and briefly comments on the alternative dynamic analysis of 
short-run prices that he recommends. In particular, the first part refutes D’Orlando’s considerations about 
the method traditionally adopted in classical analysis and discusses the claim that the characteristic 
structure of classical theory prevents consistent determination of the normal prices. The second part moves 
on to consider the basic elements of D’Orlando proposed short-period analysis and argues that they 
appear problematic on both theoretical and methodological grounds. 
. 
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Introduction  
In a recent contribution to the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Fabio D’Orlando 
(2005) criticizes the classical theory of value based on the long-period or ‘normal’ 
positions of the economy as defined by Sraffa’s equations of production. He addresses his 
critical remarks to both the method and content of the theory. As an alternative to 
traditional classical theory, he then puts forward elements of a dynamic analysis of short-
run prices that would, in his opinion, guarantee meaningful correspondence between 
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theoretical and observable magnitudes. In this paper we shall argue that neither the 
critical nor the constructive part of D’Orlando’s contribution rests on firm foundations.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 refutes D’Orlando’s remarks 
concerning the method traditionally adopted in classical analysis. Section 2 discusses the 
claim that the characteristic structure of classical theory gives rise to a serious problem as 
regards the determination of normal prices. Section 3 goes on to develop a critical 
examination of the basic features of D’Orlando’s proposed dynamic analysis. Section 4 
recapitulates the discussion developed in the paper and draws conclusions.  
 
1. D’Orlando on the method of normal positions 
In the first section of his article, D’Orlando discusses the methodological view 
predominantly held among the scholars influenced by Sraffa’s work, i.e. that the study 
and comparison of ‘normal positions’ of the economy characterized by a uniform rate of 
profit constitutes the appropriate way of relating the theory of value to observable 
phenomena (cf., for example, Garegnani, 1976, 1990a; Vianello, 1989). He claims that 
this view ultimately rests on two elements, each in fact amounting to an assumption about 
the actual economy. The first is ‘the belief that, in a freely competitive system, there are 
forces that drive the system toward long-period equalization of the rate of profits and 
that, as a result, [...] actual [...] prices tend to long-period [...] prices’ (D’Orlando, 2005: 
635, emphasis added). The second is that the circumstances taken as independent 
variables in the classical normal position—outputs, production methods and one 
distributive variable—will prove sufficiently persistent in the actual economy as to allow 
for both the ‘convergence’ of market prices towards their normal values and 
compensation of the accidental factors that may affect those prices (D’Orlando, 2005: 
636). Given this interpretation, D’Orlando objects that both assumptions are arbitrary. As 
to the first, he states that ‘no proof of convergence of actual reality toward [normal] 
positions exists’ (2005: 637, n. 8). As to the second, he argues that the presupposed 
persistence in time of the independent variables appears to be contradicted by the facts, 
and especially by the ‘rapid rate of modern technical change’ (2005: 638). According to 
D’Orlando, these observations provide sufficient grounds for doubting whether 
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traditional classical analysis can really ensure correspondence between theoretical and 
actual magnitudes. 
 It can be argued, however, that the reliance of both the ‘old’ and the modern 
classical economists on the method of normal positions is by no means founded on the 
beliefs or a priori assumptions listed by D’Orlando. First of all, we may recall that, in 
introducing the concept of ‘natural prices’ as central values toward which all commodity 
prices are constantly gravitating, Adam Smith certainly did not rely on any ‘belief’ 
concerning the gravitation process. As is well known, the tendency of observable prices 
toward their natural or normal values was asserted by Smith on the basis of a non-trivial 
theoretical argument (Smith, [1776]: Book I, ch. VI), which was later accepted by 
Ricardo and Marx. Moreover, the logic of that argument has recently been the object of 
intense debate, in the course of which some of the objections raised have prompted 
interesting generalizations of Smith’s original formulation.1 
As regards the second element mentioned by D’Orlando, it is intuitively obvious 
that a theory of value developed in terms of normal prices requires that the circumstances 
assumed to govern the exchange ratios of commodities should be persistent over time. 
D’Orlando is definitely mistaken, however, when he states that the scholars involved in 
the modern reappraisal of classical theory assume a priori that ‘the [actual] economic 
system guarantees the [...] persistence’ of those circumstances (2005: 636). Contrary to 
this claim, the requirement of persistence that a theoretical position defined along 
Sraffa’s lines must fulfil in order to qualify as a normal position (centre of gravitation) 
has been carefully examined. Moreover, arguments have been put forward indicating that 
this requirement can be met in a wider range of situations than one might think. Let us 
review the main points that have been stated.  
To begin with, it has been pointed out that a consistent definition of the classical 
normal position is compatible with some tendency of the independent variables to change 
in time, provided that this tendency can be considered sufficiently slow in relation to the 
                                                 
1 The argument for the tendency of the market price of a generic commodity to move toward its natural 
value was formulated by Smith under the implicit hypothesis that the prices and produced quantities of all 
other commodities are, on average, at their normal levels. Debate has thus recently arisen as to whether 
Smith’s conclusions could be confirmed when that hypothesis is dropped and simultaneous adjustments in 
all markets are taken into account. The doubts advanced in this respect by Steedman (1984), Nikaido 
(1985) and Lippi (1990) have been countered by Garegnani (1997) on the basis of a clarification of the 
essential premises of Smith’s argument.  
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forces that are supposed to engender the gravitation of the actual prices toward their 
theoretical levels (Garegnani, 1990b: 348). This means that, in the applications of 
classical theory, the normal position will be properly defined whenever it refers to a time 
interval during which (1) the circumstances regulating the relative prices remain 
practically unchanged and (2) adequate mobility of capital and repetition of transactions 
obtain at the same time. 
Building on the foregoing general considerations, it has then been argued that 
proper determination of the classical normal position can prove viable not only in the 
case of economies where outputs remain approximately constant in time, as is sometimes 
maintained,2 but also in the case of economies characterized by intense and protracted 
growth. The reason for this lies in the fact that when growth is sustained, the flow of 
investment in additional capital goods is necessarily larger, in proportion to the existing 
stock, than in times of slow growth. And insofar as that larger flow will tend to be 
directed primarily toward the most profitable branches of industry, it can be presumed 
that profit differentials across sectors will be corrected more quickly. A shorter time 
interval would accordingly suffice to fulfil condition (2) on capital mobility and, by 
referring the theoretical position to that shorter interval, condition (2) could be reconciled 
with the condition (1) of moderate output changes and hence of negligible changes in the 
production methods in use (Ravagnani, 2002: 377-78; cf. also Piccioni, 2003: section II). 
A similar argument has been put forward to counter the claim that the classical 
normal position cannot be consistently defined when the economy displays rapid 
technical progress and therefore ‘quick’ changes in the dominant production methods.3 
As noted by Piccioni (2003: section II), a faster rate of technical innovation generally 
entails shorter economic life of plant and higher depreciation allowances per unit of time, 
thereby increasing the flow of capital susceptible of being directed toward the most 
                                                 
2 For example, Hicks (1990: 100) takes it for granted that the theoretical positions defined in Production of 
Commodities (Sraffa, 1960) can only be regarded as abstract representations of stationary economies. The 
same opinion seems to be held by D’Orlando himself, as he writes that in Sraffa’s equations ‘quantities [of 
output] are not only known but also given, in the sense that the system will reproduce them identically’ 
(2005: 639, emphasis added). See Ravagnani (2002) for a critique of this restrictive interpretation. 
3 It should be noted in passing that this claim is just about as old as classical theory itself. For example, 
Hollander (1985: 41) reports that the treatment of rent in the Principles of Political Economy (Ricardo, 
1821) was criticized shortly after Ricardo’s death on the grounds that ongoing technical change prevents 
analysis in terms of ‘comparative statics’, i.e. based on the comparison of normal positions. 
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profitable sectors. It can be accordingly presumed that when technical progress 
accelerates, a shorter time interval will be sufficient to meet the condition (2) of adequate 
capital mobility and, as has just been seen in connection with growth, this will allow for 
definition of a theoretical position complying with both that condition and the condition 
(1) of practically unchanged production methods.  
From what has been said so far, it should be clear that the confidence in the method 
of normal positions traditionally held in the field of classical analysis is based on genuine 
economic arguments and not on arbitrary assumptions about the actual economy. Those 
arguments can of course always be discussed and criticized, but should certainly not be 
ignored. 
 
2. The alleged ‘theoretical problem’ with the classical normal positions 
2.1 D’Orlando’s statement of the problem and an initial comment 
After expounding his views on the method of analysis, D’Orlando addresses his criticism 
to the structure of classical theory. In particular, he claims that a characteristic feature of 
the classical approach, namely the determination of outputs carried out separately from 
the relative prices, gives rise to a serious theoretical problem (D’Orlando, 2005: 638). To 
substantiate this assertion, he first points out that the produced quantities taken as ‘given’ 
(separately determined) in Sraffa’s normal positions cannot be arbitrarily given but must 
coincide with the respective effectual demands, i.e. with the quantities demanded at the 
relative prices and values of the distributive variables determined by the equations of 
production. If this were not the case, he notes, outputs would tend to change together 
with production methods and the theoretical position of the economy would thus lack the 
persistence required to qualify as a centre of gravitation (D’Orlando, 2005: 639-40). 
Starting from this premise, D’Orlando then argues that Sraffa’s followers should explain 
how an output vector consistent with effectual demands that in turn depend on 
endogenously determined prices could be identified separately from, and prior to, those 
very prices (2005: 638, 640). Finally he claims that those scholars, instead of admitting 
the problem, postulate that the actual economy is usually close to a normal position and 
conclude on these grounds that the appropriate output vector can be legitimately inferred 
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from reality, in particular by taking averages of observed outputs (2005: 640-641). 
Let us pause to consider the points put forward by D’Orlando. To begin with, it 
should be noted that the issue he raises is not new and has certainly not been neglected by 
the theorists involved in the modern revival of the surplus approach. The question of the 
necessary ‘coherence’, within the classical normal position, between the separately 
determined outputs (effectual demands) and the prices resulting from the equations of 
production was indeed pointed out by Garegnani about two decades ago (cf. Garegnani, 
1990a: 137, n. 30) and has been repeatedly examined since then (cf., for example, 
Mongiovi, 1991; Piccioni, 1998). It should also be noted, contrary to D’Orlando’s claim, 
that in the contributions tackling this question it is never suggested that the theoretical 
outputs should be simply deduced from ‘observed market realizations’.4 On the other 
hand, this is hardly surprising. It would be nonsensical to assume that the actual economy 
is close to a normal position and maintain that the outputs to be taken as ‘data’ in the 
determination of the normal prices can accordingly be drawn from reality, since under 
that assumption the normal prices themselves could be inferred from observed market 
prices with no need for a theory determining them. 
It must therefore be stressed that the classical theory of normal prices does not aim 
at providing an abstract representation of observed circumstances. As has been 
convincingly argued, the purpose of the theory is to analyse the changes in value and 
distribution that an autonomous change in one independent variable would tend to bring 
about, and especially at determining the sign of those induced changes (Garegnani, 1997: 
143-44, 2003: 25, n. 40; cf. also Blaug, 2002: 239, on Ricardo’s concern with the sign of 
the changes in distribution originated by accumulation). This point is particularly 
important for proper discussion of the problem mentioned by D’Orlando, which can be 
adequately assessed only in connection with the real aim of the theory. We shall 
accordingly focus in the rest of this section on the procedure that has been suggested for 
                                                 
4 This is confirmed by the fact that D’Orlando can provide no real textual evidence to support his claim. 
He only quotes a footnote from a well-known essay by Garegnani in which the author summarizes the 
views of the ‘old’ classical economists on the circumstances determining the volume and composition of 
the social product (Garegnani, 1984: 296, n. 12). As the paragraph to which the footnote refers makes 
clear, those views are recalled in order to show that the early classical scholars did not dismiss the analysis 
of produced quantities, but thought that such analysis is best carried out separately from the study of the 
division of the product among the classes. With a striking non sequitur, however, D’Orlando (2005: 641, n. 
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dealing with the mutual dependence of outputs and prices within the framework of the 
classical analysis of changes. In particular, we shall examine the objections raised by 
D’Orlando. 
 
2.2 The analysis of economic changes carried out in separate logical stages 
It has been argued by Garegnani (1990a: 131) that, within the classical approach, the 
absence of demand and supply functions determining both the reward and the quantity 
employed of each ‘factor of production’—and hence the constellation of individual 
incomes—entails that the dependence of commodity demand on the relative prices cannot 
be expressed in terms of definite mathematical relationships (demand functions for 
products). This in turn implies that the effects of a change in one independent variable on 
value and distribution cannot be ascertained by determining the normal prices after the 
change simultaneously with the new quantities demanded and produced but must be 
analysed in a different way. In this regard, Garegnani (1990a: 130) has suggested that the 
analysis of those effects could be appropriately carried out in separate logical stages 
alternating the use of the exact relationships established by Sraffa’s equations with more 
inductive methods. 
D’Orlando criticizes the above-mentioned procedure in the article under discussion 
through reference to a hypothetical application. He imagines that analysis in separate 
stages is carried out to evaluate the consequences of an exogenous shock that disrupts the 
initial normal position of the economy by altering the effectual demand for some 
commodities. In the first stage of the analysis—as he states, following Garegnani—it will 
be assumed that outputs are adjusted to the new levels of effectual demand and that 
production methods are in turn adjusted, under ‘variable returns to scale’, to the new 
outputs. The effect of the shock will then be provisionally assessed by applying Sraffa’s 
price equations to the ‘system of production’ thus determined. It is, however, clear that 
the demand for the different commodities will tend to change again at the new prices 
identified in the first stage, and that this ‘feedback’ of prices on demand will prompt a 
corresponding further change in outputs. The second stage of the analysis, he continues, 
   
15) deduces from the footnote that, according to Garegnani, the actual economic system is generally close 
to a ‘long-period equilibrium’ (normal position).  
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should accordingly determine those ‘secondary’ output changes, which will, however, 
stimulate further changes in the technical conditions of production and therefore in both 
the relative prices and the quantities demanded, and so on. At this point, D’Orlando raises 
the following objection. In the presence of this repeated interaction among output levels, 
production methods and relative prices, how can one be sure that the analysis in separate 
stages will ‘converge’, i.e. lead to the determination of a final position of the economy 
characterized by full coherence between the price system and the quantities demanded 
and produced? He contends that there is no way of ascertaining ‘convergence’ when it is 
held that the feedbacks of prices on demand cannot be expressed through ‘formally 
specified functional relationships’, and concludes on these grounds that the analytical 
procedure suggested by Garegnani proves totally useless for identification of the normal 
prices after the shock (D’Orlando, 2005: 644). 
It can be argued, however, that D’Orlando’s drastic conclusion derives from an 
artificial view of the relations between outputs and production methods and above all 
from a misconception of the purpose of the analysis in separate stages. As regards the 
first aspect, D’Orlando reasons throughout his article as though only two hypotheses 
could be conceived about the influence of output levels on the methods in use: either that 
the latter remain strictly invariant irrespective of the quantities produced (‘constant 
returns to scale’)5 or, at the opposite extreme, that any change whatsoever in outputs will 
automatically prompt significant changes in the technical conditions of production 
(‘variable returns’). When this doubtful view is abandoned, however, and it is instead 
acknowledged that substantial output changes are generally required in order to trigger 
appreciable changes in methods, it appears clear that analysis in separate stages will lead 
to definite results in a relevant class of applications.  
Suppose, for example, that we wish to evaluate the persistent effects of a technical 
improvement in the production of a non-basic commodity traditionally consumed in the 
economy. In the first stage of the analysis, the effect on the relative price of that 
commodity, and possibly on the prices of other non-basics, will be initially assessed by 
placing the new method within the framework of Sraffa’s equations while at the same 
                                                 
5 Consider, for example, the following passage: “In the case of constant returns, Sraffa’s [system of 
equations] generates the same vector of prices for any vector of [produced] quantities” (D’Orlando, 2005: 
639, n. 12, italics in the original). 
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time keeping the output of the non-basic commodity at its original level. In the second 
stage, the feedback of those price changes on the quantities demanded and produced will 
be estimated, and it can plausibly emerge that these ‘secondary’ output changes are not 
sufficient to prompt further significant modifications in production methods. In that case, 
the theoretical prices initially determined would be fully consistent with the new outputs 
(effectual demands) identified at the second stage and could therefore be legitimately 
regarded as the normal prices after the technical change. In the same way, the new system 
of normal prices could be consistently determined when the analysis in separate stages 
focuses on the effects of comparatively limited changes in effectual demands due to 
gradual modifications of consumers’ habits or on the effects of a change in the 
independent distributive variable, to the extent that the latter change proves moderate 
enough to rule out substantial feedbacks of prices on demand.  
It should not, however, be concluded from the foregoing remarks that analysis in 
separate stages can only validly deal with cases in which the feedbacks of price changes 
are sufficiently mild. If we jettison D’Orlando’s conception of that procedure, which he 
interprets as a means to attain detailed quantitative specification of the normal position 
after a shock, and recall that the essential purpose of the theory is to assess the sign of the 
changes in normal prices, we realize that the analysis in separate stages has a more 
general scope. A simplified example will serve to illustrate this point. 
Suppose that we wish to investigate the effect of a severe import restriction that 
perturbs the initial normal position of the economy by stimulating a substantial increase 
in the effectual demand for domestically produced corn. Suppose also that, in the first 
stage of the analysis, it emerged that the adjustment of corn output to the increased 
demand would entail a worsening in the technical conditions of production and, for this 
reason, a marked rise in the price of corn in terms of the chosen numeraire.6 In the second 
stage we will have to ascertain whether this initial result can be altered by the feedback of 
the higher price on the demand for corn. In this connection, reflection indicates that the 
price increase cannot drive the demand for corn back to the original level, as in that case 
its very cause—the worsening in production conditions—would evidently disappear. 
                                                 
6 It is assumed for the sake of simplicity that the change in employment associated with the increase in 
corn production makes no appreciable difference to the workers’ bargaining position and therefore has no 
significant effect on the real wage. 
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Given the nature of the autonomous shock postulated, the only consistent conclusion to 
be drawn is therefore that the import restriction will bring about a rise in the normal price 
for corn together with a rise in the effectual demand for that commodity (cf. Piccioni, 
1998: 20-21 and Garegnani, 2007: 188, n.12 for a similar argument framed in a slightly 
different context). The analysis in separate stages would thus yield a first definite result 
concerning the direction of the change in the normal price for corn. The procedure could 
then be repeated in order to ascertain the direction in which the prices for the means of 
production of corn, or for any other commodity, would tend to change after the import 
restriction. 
In the example just provided, assessment of the sign of the change in the normal 
price for corn requires only simple qualitative evaluation of the relevant feedback. It 
should be noted, however, that the example could be easily modified in order to show 
that analysis in separate stages can deal equally well with alternative cases requiring 
more complex quantitative evaluation of the feedbacks of price changes on demand.7 It 
should also be noted that for proper quantitative evaluation of the feedbacks in those 
cases, it will be necessary to estimate the changes in individual incomes that the initial 
change in one independent variable will tend to bring about through its impact on both 
distribution and the number of workers employed. And since classical theory entails no 
mechanical tendency to full employment but acknowledges that the ultimate effect on 
employment of a change in the real wage, say, depends to a considerable extent on the 
specific socio-institutional context of the economy under examination,8 analysis at that 
stage will have to be conducted according to the circumstances of the case by means of 
primarily inductive methods. D’Orlando’s account of this aspect of the analytical 
procedure suggested by Garegnani is, however, totally misleading. He misinterprets 
                                                 
7 Suppose, for example, that it emerged in the first stage of the analysis that the increase in corn output 
required to meet the rise in effectual demand would stimulate a technical improvement in the production of 
‘ploughs’ and, for this reason, a marked fall in the price of corn. Suppose also that it emerged in the second 
stage that the further increase in corn production prompted by that fall would require cultivation of less 
fertile lands, thereby giving rise to partial recovery of the price for corn. Under these alternative 
circumstances, it could be consistently concluded that the import restriction would bring about a fall in the 
normal price of corn together with a rise in the effectual demand for that commodity. 
8 Consider for example the effect of an increase in the wage rate on the number of workers employed. As 
Marx pointed out, entrepreneurs could react to the ensuing fall in the profit rate by reducing investment, 
thereby giving rise to a slowdown of the economy and a decrease in employment. The effect would be 
entirely different, however, in the case of a rise in wages taking place within the context of an institutional 
agreement aimed at increasing domestic consumption and the general activity level of the country. 
12 
 
 
 
 
Garegnani’s remarks about the necessarily inductive assessment of the relevant feedbacks 
and surprisingly ascribes to him the absurd view that, in the course of the procedure, the 
quantities demanded at the provisional prices determined through Sraffa’s equations 
should not be the object of analysis but simply be inferred from observed reality 
(D’Orlando, 2005: 644-45).9  
 
3. On D’Orlando’s proposed dynamic analysis  
The previous sections have discussed the methodological and theoretical objections that 
D’Orlando raises with respect to traditional classical analysis. We shall now briefly 
examine the alternative theory that he suggests on the basis of those objections. 
 In general terms, D’Orlando (2005: 647-51) advocates a theory of value based on 
demand and supply functions that analyses the evolution of the price system over a 
sequence of short-period positions of the economy. More specifically, he argues that a 
valuable initial step toward the proposed ‘dynamic’ analysis is provided by Caravale’s 
(1994) model of price determination in the short run. Let us recall the relevant features of 
this model. 
 As D’Orlando points out, the core of the model lies in the following theoretical 
representation of the transactions held in a generic ‘market period’. At the beginning of 
the period, the producers of each industry bring to market quantities of commodities that 
are the outcome of their past production decisions and announce an initial price for their 
product. The quantities demanded at the announced prices are then determined through 
formalized demand functions and it is assumed that the quantity initially sold of each 
commodity will correspond to the smaller between the total amount made available and 
that demanded by the complex of agents. As the quantities initially demanded will 
                                                 
9 The absurdity lies in the fact that the prices provisionally determined in the course of the procedure and 
the corresponding quantities demanded both refer to the conditions of the economy after a hypothetical 
change in one independent variable and are therefore themselves hypothetical, non-observable magnitudes. 
For the misinterpretation of Garegnani’s position, consider the following passage: 
‘Garegnani […] maintains that […] the quantities demanded at those [virtual] prices […] cannot 
be identified a priori but can be “analysed in accordance with the case under consideration” […] 
since they are influenced by “social and political factors […]”. What this analysis “in accordance 
with the circumstances of the case” means is not crystal clear. […] One [possible interpretation] 
is that these quantities are observable […]’ (D’Orlando & Nisticò, 2000: 16).  
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generally not be sufficient to clear all markets, it is further assumed that the producers of 
the commodities in excess supply adjust their prices and sell an additional portion of their 
outputs in a second round of transactions. The process of price revisions and trading at 
‘false’ prices then continues until all the markets are eventually cleared. This process will 
thus give rise, within the market period, to a sequence of ‘temporary market prices’ for 
each commodity, whose weighted average is called the ‘actual equilibrium market price’. 
Determination of the ‘actual equilibrium market prices’ of the different commodities is 
the ultimate aim of the analysis. 
It should be noted that in the theoretical representation outlined above, the demand 
functions driving transactions are probabilistic in the sense that each of them 
incorporates a ‘random disturbance’ designed to express the influence on demand of all 
sorts of accidental factors. It follows that the ‘actual equilibrium market prices’ 
determined by the model are themselves random variables whose range will evidently 
reflect the range of the disturbances. According to D’Orlando, this probabilistic 
qualification of the theoretical prices has remarkable implications. Even though the 
model addresses short-run magnitudes that cannot be centres of gravitation, he argues, 
the fact that the ‘actual market clearing prices’ are random variables entails that 
meaningful correspondence can still be established between theoretical and observable 
prices. In particular, this correspondence would be ensured ‘as long as the realization of 
the random variable—that is, the observed market price—lies within the range of the 
disturbance’ (D’Orlando, 2005: 649). D’Orlando accordingly concludes that Caravale’s 
‘attempt to formalize the interdependence between prices and quantities […] outside the 
long-period method […] has the potential to avoid the main drawbacks of […] the 
Sraffian approach’ (2005: 650) and, at the same time, ‘ensure[s] that theory corresponds 
to reality’ (2005: 651).  
We cannot agree with D’Orlando’s conclusion, however, as three aspects of the 
short-run analysis he praises give rise to serious misgivings. The first is strictly 
theoretical and concerns the foundations of demand functions. If we look at Caravale’s 
original specification of those functions, and ignore for a moment the random 
disturbances attached to them, we see that the quantity demanded of any commodity is 
assumed to depend exclusively on the relative prices (Caravale, 1994: 58, equation (3.3)). 
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The quantities demanded in any given price situation are, however, inevitably influenced 
by the purchasing power of individual agents and it is not clear how that further 
determinant of demand decisions can be taken into account within the postulated 
transaction scheme. Consider, for example, the quantity of ‘beans’ demanded by a 
producer of ‘meat’ when prices are announced at the opening of the market period. How 
can that quantity be identified without knowing the producer’s purchasing power, which 
will be determined only ex post by the receipts from the sale of his output? Closer 
examination reveals that the problem is ‘solved’ in Caravale’s model by assuming that 
after the announcement of the initial prices, the meat producer reckons the relative prices 
in terms of his product and plans to ‘buy’ beans by offering the required quantity of meat 
directly to the producers of those vegetables. In other words, the model actually assumes 
a barter economy in which the desired commodity bundles are obtained through bilateral 
exchanges (Caravale, 1994: 58, equations (3.3 )-(3.4)). It would be interesting to know 
how D’Orlando plans to deal with the problem of the purchasing power of agents once 
the peculiar hypothesis of a barter economy is dropped.  
 The second puzzling aspect is the view that, in a short-period setting, the influence 
of accidental forces on the demand for commodities can be adequately modelled by 
appending random disturbances to the systematic component of demand functions. It is 
unclear how accurate quantitative specification of those disturbances could ever be 
attained, given that estimation of their range alone would involve ascertaining the effects 
of the countless contingent factors that may affect demand in any given market period. 
This problem certainly cannot be ducked by simply stating that the parameters of the 
disturbances should be ‘suitably chosen’ by the theorist (Caravale, 1994: 59).  
 Finally, let us suppose for the sake of discussion that the random disturbances have 
somehow been correctly specified and that the possible values of the ‘actual market 
clearing prices’ have been determined accordingly. In the likely event of the range of 
those values proving very broad, the whole exercise will ultimately indicate that the 
prices prevailing in a generic market period, and even more the path of those short-run 
prices, are in fact regulated by accidental factors and not by circumstances amenable to 
theoretical treatment. Since D’Orlando himself touches on this shortcoming in an earlier 
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paper,10 one might wonder why he does not mention it in the recent contribution under 
discussion here. One reason may lie in the analogy that he now sees between the results 
of his proposed short-period price determination and those produced by Duncan Foley’s 
‘statistical equilibrium’ theory of markets, which depends on a probabilistic 
representation of potential transactions (D’Orlando, 2005: 651). The analogy is highly 
questionable, however, as Foley’s construction has the considerable advantage of 
allowing for univocal determination of the plausible market outcome when the number of 
agents is sufficiently large.11  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the critical objections that D’Orlando raises with respect 
to the classical theory of value based on normal positions and briefly commented on the 
alternative analysis that he recommends. 
We first point out that reliance on the method of normal positions on the part of 
classical scholars does not rest on unwarranted postulates about the actual economy—as 
D’Orlando claims—but on carefully developed arguments concerning both the 
‘persistence’ of the circumstances governing the exchange ratios of commodities and the 
tendency of market prices toward their normal levels. We then discuss the claim that the 
separate determination of produced quantities creates a problem within classical theory in 
that it prevents adequate treatment of the interdependence of outputs and prices and 
hence consistent determination of the normal prices. We argue that classical theory is 
essentially concerned with the sign of the changes in normal prices and point out that 
definite results in this respect can be consistently achieved by means of the analysis in 
separate logical stages put forward by Garegnani. 
 Finally, attention is focused on the alternative dynamic theory advocated by 
D’Orlando, and especially on the model of price determination in the short-run that 
should be at its centre. It is argued that the foundations of the demand functions playing a 
                                                 
10 ‘[R]ecourse to probabilistic qualifications might lead to […] indeterminacy, with the disturbances 
becoming more important than the economic data in determining the evolution of the system’ (D’Orlando 
1997: 77, our translation). 
11 It may be useful to recall that Foley defines the ‘statistical equilibrium’ of a market as the configuration 
of transactions with maximum likelihood over the set of possible configurations and then shows that the 
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major role in the model are problematic and that the alleged correspondence between the 
theoretical short- run prices and observable market prices is questionable.  
 In the light of the considerations developed in this paper, we therefore maintain that 
D’Orlando’s critique of the classical theory of normal prices is not well founded and that 
his proposed alternative analysis is open to doubt on both theoretical and methodological 
grounds.  
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